A-LEVEL
PHILOSOPHY
7172/1

Paper 1 Epistemology and moral philosophy

Mark scheme

June 2020

Version: 1.0 Final Mark Scheme

206A7172/1/MS

Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

Further copies of this mark scheme are available from aqa.org.uk.

Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the performance at the mid-point of the level. There are marks in each level. For the 3 and 5 mark questions that have only 1 mark in each level you need only apply step 1 below.

To support you in your marking, you will have standardisation scripts. These have been marked by the Lead Examiner at the correct standard. Generally, you will have a standardisation script to exemplify the standard for each level of the mark scheme for a particular item.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

Step 1 Determine a level

Start by reading the whole of the student's response and then, using the mark scheme level descriptors and the standardisation scripts, place the response in the level which it matches or best fits.
When assigning a level you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest.

Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. Start with the middle mark of the level and then look at the student's response in comparison with the level descriptor and the standardisation script. If the student's response is better than the standardisation script, award a mark above the mid-point of the level. If the student's response is weaker than the standardisation script, award a mark below the mid-point of the level.

For the 25 mark questions examiners should bear in mind the relative weightings of the assessment objectives and be careful not to over/under credit a particular skill. This will be exemplified and reinforced as part of examiner training.

Guidance

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other appropriate points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded zero marks.

Section A – Epistemology

0 1 What does Descartes mean by 'clear and distinct ideas'?

[3 marks]

AO1 = 3

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
3	A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision.
1	Relevant, but fragmented, points.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

In relation to the **'clarity'** of these ideas, students may make the following points:

- the content of the concept or the truth of the proposition is immediately accessible
- They are indubitable
- They are known with certainty
- They are self-evident/self-justifying/non-inferentially justified.

In relation to the **'distinctness'** of these ideas, students may make the following points:

- one can distinguish this concept/proposition from others (one cannot confuse it with other concepts/propositions) (ie it is "distinct").

In relation to **the way in which these ideas are known**, students may make the following points:

- They are a priori / known through thought or reason alone
- Refer to the role of clear and distinct ideas within Descartes' method of intuition and deduction

In addition to the three elements stated above, students may:

- provide examples of things that Descartes knows clearly and distinctly – examples are not creditworthy in themselves / in isolation but can be used to clarify what Descartes meant by 'clear and distinct' ideas – where understanding of the above elements is clear in these examples credit should be awarded accordingly.

Here is Descartes' explanation of this (though, NB, this is not from the *Meditations* which is the AQA set text, so we do not expect students to reference this passage; it is here for information only):

- I call a perception 'clear' when it is present and accessible to the attentive mind - just as we say that we see something clearly when it is present to the eye's gaze and stimulates it with a sufficient degree of strength and accessibility. I call a perception 'distinct' if, as well as being clear, it is so sharply separated from all other perceptions that it contains within itself only what is clear. (*Principles of Philosophy,* René Descartes).

0 2 Explain why there might be a problem with the role played by God in Berkeley's idealism.
[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content
Students may set the context by briefly explaining/defining:

- Berkeley's idealism, namely that the immediate objects of perception (ie ordinary objects such as tables, chairs, etc) are mind-dependent objects.
- The role of God within this theory:
    - Berkeley argues for God as the cause of our (non-hallucinatory) sensory ideas based on their coherence and consistency (Berkeley rules out our own minds and other ideas as possible causes).
    - God's mind contains ideas when they are not currently perceived by us.
    - God maintains the laws of nature.
    - God is an ontological guarantor (he guarantees the existence of objects which exist independent of our individual minds).
    - God is an epistemological guarantor (he guarantees that our beliefs about the world can be true in so far as they reflect the world that is independent of our individual minds).
    - The (inference to the) existence of God is supposed to address both atheism and scepticism.

Students need to then explain at least one problem with God playing this role. The following are some examples of problems that students could identify:

- Berkeley says that God is a being who "can suffer nothing, nor be affected with any painful sensation, or indeed any sensation at all" ('Three Dialogues'). The problem is that (a) if ordinary objects are collections of qualities, these being ideas and (b) these objects have an existence independent of my mind or any finite mind, then (c) whilst they could be ideas of an infinite mind, they (d) couldn't be the same ideas if God's ideas are non-sensory and so (e) it can't simply be said that these physical objects exist in God's mind in the way that they do in my mind.
- If God causes painful/non-veridical experiences, then the problem of evil/bad/pain can be invoked in this context - if God is directly responsible for all sensory ideas, then he is directly responsible for painful/non-veridical ideas and this would mean that he was imperfect.
- Belief in God is not justified given that we have no direct experience of God, so (following Berkeley's empiricism) we shouldn't conclude that God exists.
- I cannot form a concept of God given Berkeley's commitment to empiricism and the fact that I have no direct experience of anything other than my own mind. This would seem to follow the logic of the

master argument - if I can only conceive of objects that are mind-dependent, then God (a being whose existence is independent of my mind) is not a being I can conceive of. If the implication for mind-independent objects is that they are therefore impossible, then the same implication should apply with God.

- I am naturally inclined to believe in the existence of mind-independent objects (as Russell says, it is an "instinctive belief") so if Berkeley was right, then this being which is causing my sensory ideas would be a deceiver and cannot be God. Students might in this context refer to Descartes' argument for the existence of mind-independent objects, based on the existence of a benevolent God.
- It can be argued that Berkeley's argument for God's existence fails:
    - The cause of something 'mental'/immaterial need not be something 'mental'/immaterial.
- Even if we concede that an immaterial being is causing our sensory ideas, this need not be a God, with all the classic characteristics that entails (ie omniscient, benevolent, omnipotent etc) and need not be one God (it could be many spirits).
- Why does God generates ideas of, eg the insides of plants, etc, when he doesn't need to?
- There is a circularity with the way in which Berkeley uses God. Students may note that Idealism serves as a proof of God's existence (e.g. since God is required to explain origins of sensations) but that Idealism cannot be accepted without assuming the existence of God (e.g.the existence of God is required to guarantee the existence of objects outside of the minds of individual perceivers and therefore to support idealism).

This is not an exhaustive list, and points made need to be judged on their merits according to the levels of response.

0 3 Explain the view that belief is **not** a necessary condition for knowledge.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Background/context (unrequired):

- There is no need for students to put this in the context of any general account of the conditions which need to be met for S to know that p, but many will explain/understand this within the context of the tripartite (JTB) account of knowledge (that knowledge is justified true belief).
- Some students might begin by explaining the sort of motivation there is for claiming that belief <u>is</u> a necessary condition, but again this is not required. If they did it might involve something like the following:
    - The mere fact that p is true does not entail that S knows it. There must be some connection (mental relation) between S and p. This relation cannot be "wonders whether", "fears that", "hopes that" as they are incompatible with her knowing that p. If she is to know that p, she must accept p is true, ie she must believe that p.

Key content

- The best answers will demonstrate understanding of what is meant by a 'necessary condition' for X. Namely, a condition which must be met in order for X to be the case.
- Students' attempts to explain that belief is not a necessary condition for knowledge could take one of the following forms:
    - (a) showing that there is at least one case (a counter-example) where someone does not believe that p, but nonetheless knows that p. One needs to argue that one can have knowledge of a proposition without accepting it as true (or at least without being disposed to assent to that proposition).
        - Radford-style examples like the following should be expected: Imagine a person once learnt some information and now has forgotten that they did so. They then give a large number of correct answers in a quiz on that topic but feel like they are merely guessing the answers. We might say of such a person that they know the answers even though they do not believe (to be true) any of the things they said. They may even, later on, say this of themselves, having realised their level of accuracy
    - (b) showing that belief and knowledge are mutually exclusive mental states (in the *Republic* Plato, for example, takes a version of this view by distinguishing belief from knowledge on the basis of their objects – what they are of/about). Students may refer to belief and knowledge as fundamentally different ways of apprehending or grasping

concepts/propositions – to believe is to grasp only dubitably and involving fallibly, whereas to know is to grasp with certainty - knowledge being indubitable and infallible.

- (c) This view could be also/instead be explained in the context of a possible interpretation of the innate knowledge thesis. If someone claimed that we have knowledge of particular propositions from birth, but are not aware of this knowledge until there is some sort of "triggering", then this might look to be a case of someone knowing that p, though not (yet) believing that p (ie not yet aware that they have this knowledge). (NB: This scenario is what Locke described as "near a contradiction" in his debate with Leibniz).

0 4 Outline philosophical scepticism **and** explain how reliabilism responds to it.

[12 marks]

AO1 = 12

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
10–12	The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response.
1–3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

<u>Outline philosophical scepticism:</u>

- Philosophical scepticism attempts to make doubtful all propositions that we believe to be knowable within a particular class of propositions.
- Philosophical scepticism is the position that one or more of our usual methods of justification for claiming that our beliefs amount to knowledge are inadequate, so we do not in fact have knowledge.
- Students may note that philosophical skepticism may amount to the claim that knowledge is impossible – either because standards of justification required cannot be met, or because there is no possible justification for propositions.
- Philosophical skepticism can be local or global in its application.
- Examples of philosophical scepticism include:
    - scepticism about knowledge of the existence/nature of mind-independent ordinary objects (external world scepticism)
    - scepticism about knowledge of the existence/nature of other minds (epistemological solipsism)
    - scepticism about knowledge of past events.
- Such scepticism is ordinarily motivated by the possibility of a scenario/hypothesis which we cannot show to be false – a “sceptical hypothesis” (expect discussions of Descartes’ evil demon or brains in vats).
- Students may attempt to distinguish philosophical scepticism from ‘normal incredulity’ – this is acceptable as a way of highlighting or explaining the nature of philosophical scepticism.

And explain how reliabilism responds to it.

Reliabilism:

- Reliabilism is a theory about the requirements which need to be met for someone to have knowledge. The relevant line in the specification is: "replace 'justified' with 'reliably formed' (R+T+B) (ie reliabilism)".
- Students are likely to explain the general view in the following way (or similar):
    - *S* knows that *p* iff (if and only if)
    - *p* is true
    - *S* believes that *p*
    - *S*'s belief that *p* was produced by a reliable (cognitive) process.
- This may be explained as being the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, and these terms might be explained. Knowledge is true belief produced by a reliable method.
- The reliability of a (cognitive) process will most likely be explained in terms of its tendency to cause true beliefs. Examples of reliable processes given by philosophers have included: memory, perception, testimony, introspection.

Note: reliabilism may be explained and/or illustrated with reference to Gettier-style examples (for instance, how replacing justified with 'reliably formed' might address Gettier-style counter examples to the tripartite view). This is acceptable as part of an account of reliabilism. However, students must not simply explain how reliabilism can overcome Gettier examples but must ensure that they explain how it responds to philosophical scepticism.

How reliabilism responds to philosophical scepticism:

- Reliabilism as a theory of knowledge is often seen as an "externalist" view since information about the process itself and its reliability need not be accessible to the agent in order for it to be true that the agent has knowledge. Whether a belief is known depends on external factors other than truth (some students might explain this by drawing Goldman's distinction between the verification conditions and the truth conditions). It is in this way that it can be seen to provide a response to philosophical scepticism.
- Sceptical arguments try to show that people cannot give an adequate justification of the claims they make because of the sceptical hypotheses (eg dreaming/evil demon), and that therefore they do not have knowledge of these claims.
- The reliabilist, if they do not think that "having a justification" is a necessary condition for knowledge, is not affected by this challenge. They think whether we know that p is not based on whether we can give an adequate (scepticism-defeating) justification of p, but rather on whether p was in fact produced reliably or not (whether we know this or not).
- To put this in the context of external world scepticism: for the reliabilist, whether I know that there is a desk in front of me depends on whether my belief has been reliably produced.
- If there is an evil demon causing my experiences/beliefs then my belief has NOT been reliably caused and so is not knowledge.
- However, if my beliefs are being caused in the ordinary/normal reliable perceptual way (namely through light bouncing off the desk into my eyes etc), then I do know that there is a desk.
- Crucially, I do not need to know that there is not an evil demon in order to know that there is a desk in front of me. There just needs to, in fact, not be such a deceiving being.

0 5 How convincing is direct realism?

[25 marks]

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
21–25	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained. The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout. The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
16–20	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained. The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently. The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it. Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended. There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
11–15	A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent. The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated. A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole. Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument.
6–10	The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but not fully coherently. The content is largely correct, though there are some gaps and a lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified, but not integrated. Alternative positions are identified, but not precisely. Counter-arguments might be stated in weak forms or even slightly misrepresented. Arguments and counter-arguments are juxtaposed, so similarities and contrasts identified, rather than their impact being clear.

	Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always fully correctly and/or consistently.
1–5	There is little evidence of an argument. There may be missing content, substantial gaps in the content or the content may be one-sided. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made. There may be some connections between the points, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There is some basic use of philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content
Students may well explain what is meant by direct realism:
- the theory that 'the immediate objects of perception are mind-independent objects and their properties' (AQA Specification).
- by "mind-independent objects" is meant objects which exist whether or not they are perceived or conceived of.

A distinction may also be made between 'naïve direct realism' (that we directly perceive mind independent objects, and that those objects are always as they appear in our perceptions), and other forms of direct realism (that we do *directly* perceive mind independent objects, but this does not entail that the world of mind independent objects always is as it appears).

Conclusions may be drawn by arguing for and against some of the following positions, drawing from the supporting content bullet-pointed underneath (though this list is not exhaustive).

CONVINCING:
Direct realism is convincing: the immediate objects of perception are mind-independent (arguing for direct realism *for broadly metaphysical/ontological reasons)*:
- This avoids problems arising from the view that mind-dependent objects (particularly non-physical sense-data) represent mind-independent objects: there is not enough in common between these different types of objects to sustain this relationship of representation - this may be linked to questions about intentionality/representative content and/or Berkeley's "likeness" principle.
- This avoids problems arising from the view that mind-dependent objects (particularly non-physical sense data) are caused by mind-independent objects: there is not enough in common between these different types of objects to sustain this relationship of causation – this may be linked to questions about mind-body causation and so put as an anti-dualist and pro-materialist argument.
- This avoids other problems associated with sense-data: location issues (where are they?), and the issue of indeterminacy (eg the speckled hen problem).

CONVINCING:
Direct realism is convincing: the immediate objects of perception are mind-independent (arguing for direct realism *for broadly epistemological reasons*):
- Such immediate awareness of mind-independent reality is required in order for knowledge of reality to be possible (a transcendental-style argument) – this view avoids the scepticism that faces indirect realism (the 'veil of perception').
- This is how things appear introspectively - ie that we are aware of mind-independent objects and not of experiences (the 'transparency' of experience).
- Statements about external mind-independent objects are irreducible to statements about 'mere' experiences.
- It can be argued that arguments against this view (see below) are invalid and/or rest on confusions and hence pose no real threat.

UNCONVINCING:
Direct realism is not convincing: the immediate objects of perception are never mind-independent, although mind-independent objects (probably/definitely) do exist: ie arguing for indirect realism:

- The argument from illusion
- The argument from perceptual variation
- The argument from hallucination (the possibility of experiences that are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perception)
- The time-lag argument
- The argument from science (differences between the ordinary or folk conception of objects and the scientific conception)
    - NB: It might be argued to be convincing to the extent that it can respond to these arguments.

UNCONVINCING:
Direct realism is not convincing: the immediate objects of perception are never mind-independent because mind-independent objects of perceptual experience do not exist (ie arguing for either idealism or some form of phenomenalism):

- Berkeley's 'Master' argument (and other arguments he gives) can be interpreted as demonstrating that we cannot have a coherent idea of any mind-independent object of perceptual experience and it may therefore follow that such objects are impossible.

UNCONVINCING:
Direct realism is not convincing: the immediate objects of perception are not mind-independent, ie arguing generally against direct realism:

- The argument from perceptual variation (Russell's table example), which can be used to support either indirect realism or idealism.
- Berkeley's arguments against Locke's primary/secondary property distinction: intended to show that all the immediate properties of perception are mind-dependent.

PARTIALLY CONVINCING:
Direct realism is partially convincing: the immediate objects of perception are sometimes but not always mind-independent, ie arguing for a metaphysical disjunctivism in which illusions and/or hallucinations do have sense-data as immediate objects of perception (eg as with Austin).

- Doing so by attacking the 'common factor principle' in arguments from illusion and hallucination, ie denying that subjectively indistinguishable experiences must involve immediate perception of the same kind of object.

CAN'T BE ANSWERED:
This is a question that, for some reason, it is impossible to answer. Perhaps because there is no way of telling, from the first-person perspective (from 'the inside'), what it is that you are aware of during perception.

Notes

Students should not be unduly penalised for misattributing arguments: the focus is on AO2 (evaluation). Persistent misattribution of arguments would be an imprecision that would justify not awarding an argument full marks, but it should not be regarded as a reason for excluding it from the top band (assuming everything else meets the requirements of the level descriptors).

This indicative content is not exhaustive; other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

Section B – Moral philosophy

0 6 Outline Ayer's verification principle.

[3 marks]

AO1 = 3

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
3	A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision.
1	Relevant, but fragmented, points.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content
Ayer formulated the verification principle in two ways. They are covered by the outline below.

As this is a 3 mark question, we do not expect students to explain both the "weak" and "strong" notions of empirical verification (ie the italicised content below) or indeed to even make this distinction. They can just explain one or the other, or mention neither.

Ayer's verification principle:
A proposition is meaningful (accept: factually significant/cognitive/truth-apt) if and only if **either:**

- (1) it is analytically true/false

or

- its truth or falsity can be empirically verified (it is factually meaningful)
    - either in the sense that…
        - (2a) its truth could be conclusively empirically verified in practice (strong version)

      or at least that…

        - (2b) …its probable truth could be empirically verified in principle (weak version)
        - Some might explain this by saying that a factually meaningful sentence is one for which there is a set of empirically-verifiable conditions under which it is true.

Note
This indicative content is not exhaustive; other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

0 7 Explain Kant's first formulation of the categorical imperative.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Students may explain more generally what a 'categorical imperative' is
- The first formulation of the Categorical Imperative is used as a way of deriving more specific duties and is stated thus: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (*Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 1785, 4:421).
- Acting on a maxim which does not pass this test (ie cannot be so willed) is morally wrong.
- Maxims that pass this test (ie can be so willed) are morally permissible (NB: they are not morally obligatory).
- A maxim fails the test of the Categorical Imperative if universalising it leads to a contradiction.
- There are two types of contradictions that Kant discusses:
    - a contradiction in conception (a logical contradiction) which leads to perfect duties (which are duties to never to X)
    - a contradiction in the will (ie they contradict something that we rationally must will) which leads to imperfect duties (which are duties to do Y to at least some extent).
- It is likely that they may have more of a focus on contradictions in conception, and this is fine.

- Students are likely to use examples. The following table shows the examples he gives of each kind of contradiction:

	…to oneself	…to others
Perfect duty…	*…not to commit suicide*	*…not to make false promises*
Imperfect duties…	*…to develop one's talents*	*…to help others*

Here is the example of false promises developed in more detail: for example, in the case of making false promises to get what you want, Kant would argue that your maxim would be 'I can make a false promise, if it gets me what I want.' If, however, you universalised this, then you would have to say 'all rational agents must, by a law of nature, make false promises, when it gets them what they want.' However, successfully making a false promise to someone presupposes them taking you at your word, but, in this world, no one would do so. So my maxim cannot exist with itself as a universal law.

0 8 Explain Moore's 'open question argument'.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Moore's "open question argument" (OQA) attempts to prove that moral properties cannot be reduced to any non-moral properties, that they are their own unique sort of properties.
- He describes them as being sui generis, which means "of its (his, her, or their) own kind; in a class by itself; unique".
- Moore uses the OQA to support his non-reductive non-naturalist position (intuitionism).
- He argues against any theory that attempts to reduce moral properties to non-moral ones (theories such as: utilitarianism; virtue ethics, Divine Command Theory).

Moore's distinction between an open question and a closed question:

- A closed question is a question whose answer is decided by the meanings of the concepts involved in the question whereas an open question is a question whose answer cannot be decided in this way.

Here is the "open question argument" set out in standard form (though students may present it differently).

- P1: For all concepts in the place of <X>: <It is X, but is it morally good?> is an open question
- P2: If so, then no other concept has the same meaning as the concept <morally good>. (This is a claim about what makes two concepts synonymous)
- P3: If so, then the property of moral goodness is neither identical to nor reducible to any other property
- C: Therefore, the property of moral goodness is neither identical to nor reducible to any other property.

This can be applied to specific theories (e.g. utilitarianism below) but Moore claims that it works regardless of which property we use in the underlined spot:

- P1: <It is pleasurable, but is it morally good?> is an open question
- P2: If so, then the concept <pleasurable> does not have the same meaning as the concept <morally good>
- P3: If so, then the property of moral goodness is neither identical to nor reducible to pleasurableness
- C: Therefore, the property of moral goodness is neither identical to nor reducible to pleasurableness.

Some students might mention (without redundancy) that although Moore used this to support his non-reductive non-naturalist position (intuitionism), it arguably doesn't quite go as far as proving that:

- Firstly, it proves that IF moral properties exist, then they must be sui generis. This means that it doesn't prove that they do exist - for this reason; non-cognitivists and error theorists have used this argument to help to support their position.

- Furthermore, even if moral properties do exist, this argument doesn't prove that they must be non-natural - so a non-reductive naturalist might say that so long as moral properties are sui generis *natural* properties, this argument would not threaten them –
- Expect students to set up the OQA as an attack on naturalism – this is acceptable.

Note
This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

0 9 Explain Bentham's utilitarianism **and** explain how Nozick's experience machine challenges this view.

[12 marks]

AO1= 12

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
10–12	The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response.
1–3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

<u>Explain Bentham's utilitarianism…</u>

Students should outline Bentham's utilitarianism in general:

- Bentham is a hedonistic utilitarian
    - [Utilitarian] He argues that actions are morally right/good to the extent that they maximise utility
    - [Hedonistic] By "utility" he means happiness which he understands as the balance of pleasure over pain (maximising pleasure, minimising pain). He claims that only pleasure is intrinsically/ultimately valuable: "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure." *(The Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789), Chapter 1).
- Bentham is a quantitative utilitarian. For Bentham it is the quantity of pleasure that matters. He does not (as Mill does) see there being any morally important difference between types of pleasure. He does not make any qualitative distinctions between pleasure based on its type, its origin or indeed what the pleasure is being taken in.
- Utilitarians, as consequentialists, decide whether actions are morally right or wrong based on their effects/consequences.
- Bentham is ordinarily understood as an act utilitarian (eg the maximisation is decided on a case-by-case basis).

- Bentham's utilitarianism would impartially consider the effects of the decision on all those whom the theory identifies as 'morally salient creatures' ('every man to count for one, nobody to count for more than one').

Bentham says that if we are comparing the amount of pleasure or pain that we will get from two rival courses of action we must go through three stages:

- We must look into the value of the initial pleasure or pain itself which is caused by the action, by considering:
    - The intensity of the pleasure/pain
    - The duration of the pleasure/pain
    - The certainty that the pleasure/pain will occur
    - The propinquity of the pleasure: how soon it will occur
- We must then find out what the likely further/later effects of the action will be (after the initial pleasure/pain), by considering:
    - The fecundity of the action: how much it leads to the same kind of sensation
    - The purity of the action: how little it leads to the opposite kind of sensation
- Finally, we must then consider the extent: ie the number of people affected by the action.

…and explain how Nozick's experience machine challenges this view.

- Bentham presupposes psychological hedonism (the view that as a matter of fact all we desire is happiness/pleasure) in order to argue for ethical hedonism (the view that we ought to desire happiness/pleasure).
- Nozick's experience machine challenges psychological hedonism and thereby undermines Bentham's argument for ethical hedonism.
- In order to explain how Nozick's thought experiment challenges Bentham's utilitarianism, the student will need to outline the thought experiment, and what it shows, and then successfully connect this back to the claim that Bentham is making.
- Nozick says: *"Imagine a machine that could give you any experience (or sequence of experiences) you might desire. When connected to this experience machine, you can have the experience of writing a great poem or bringing about world peace or loving someone and being loved in return. You can experience the felt pleasures of these things, how they feel "from the inside." You can program your experiences for tomorrow, or this week, or this year, or even for the rest of your life." Anarchy, State, and Utopia (*1974)

There are some important things to note about this imagined scenario:

- "The question is not whether to try the machine temporarily, but whether to enter it for the rest of your life."
- "Upon entering, you will not remember having done this; so no pleasures will get ruined by realizing they are machine produced."
- NB: Students must not confuse the machine Nozick describes with a simpler pleasure machine in which they are kept in a permanent drug-induced high.

Here's Nozick's objection in standard form:

- P1: Bentham claims that as a matter of fact all we desire is happiness/pleasure
- P2: If as a matter of fact all we desire is happiness/pleasure, then we would have no good reason not to plug into the experience machine (assuming it increased the quantity of pleasure experienced)
- P3: However, we do have good reasons not to plug into the experience machine, such as that
    - we care about what actually is the case, not just how things seem
    - we want to be connected to reality
    - we want to be able to change reality, and
    - we want to share reality with other people and to affect them
- C: Therefore, Bentham's claim that as a matter of fact all we desire is happiness/pleasure is not true.

Note

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

1 0 How convincing is Aristotelian virtue ethics?

[25 marks]

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
21–25	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained. The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout. The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
16–20	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained. The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently. The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it. Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended. There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
11–15	A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent. The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated. A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole. Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument.
6–10	The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but not fully coherently. The content is largely correct, though there are some gaps and a lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified, but not integrated. Alternative positions are identified, but not precisely. Counter-arguments might be stated in weak forms or even slightly misrepresented. Arguments and counter-arguments are juxtaposed, so similarities and contrasts identified, rather than their impact being clear. Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always fully correctly and/or consistently.

1–5	There is little evidence of an argument. There may be missing content, substantial gaps in the content or the content may be one-sided. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made. There may be some connections between the points, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There is some basic use of philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content
Aristotle's ethical view, in general, is based around the development of good moral character: it is agent centred rather than act centred.

When explaining Aristotle's views students are likely to make reference to one or more of the following:
- 'The good' for human beings: the meaning of eudaimonia (living well and doing well) as the 'final end' for human beings (and the relationship between eudaimonia and pleasure).
- The function argument (with rationality understood as the distinctive characteristic of human beings (or rational activity as the characteristic activity - "a life of reason in accordance with virtue.")) and the relationship between virtue/excellence and function/*ergon.*
- Aristotle's account of virtues and vices:
    - virtues as character traits/dispositions and the importance of feelings (virtue may perhaps be distinguished from mere continence)
    - the role of education/habituation in the development of moral character (perhaps including reference to the state and to family/role-models)
    - the skill analogy
    - doctrine of the mean and its application to particular virtues
    - the relationship between virtues, actions and reasons and the role of practical reasoning/practical wisdom
    - Moral responsibility: voluntary, involuntary, and non-voluntary actions.

It is likely that students will focus primarily on Aristotle, but the word "Aristotelian" in the question allows for the whole essay to be focused on those writing in the virtue ethics tradition. If the student does this, there is no problem with this.

It is possible that students may decide to focus quite specifically and in detail on certain of these features of Aristotle's theory, perhaps because their preferred lines of argument relate specifically to them (eg that in emphasising the importance of education/habituation Aristotle leaves too much to chance in the development of good character).

Some students may mention that Aristotelian virtue ethics can be situated in metaethical discussions as an example of moral realism and ethical naturalism: the truths of ethics are derived from (or reducible/identical to) facts about human nature that are discoverable through observation. They may do this in order to then evaluate this approach by applying arguments for or against moral realism and/or ethical naturalism.

The overarching positions adopted could be among the following:
- YES: it is (very) convincing---ie the student may support and/or defend an Aristotelian account.
- NO: it is not (very) convincing---ie the student may argue that it cannot be adequately supported and/or that there are (fatal) issues with the account.
- YES and NO: it is convincing in some respects but not in others---this may end up still meaning it is rejected, or alternatively it may be accepted but with some qualification.
- YES and NO: it is convincing but incomplete in some way.

Arguments will likely draw from the bullet-pointed lists underneath (though this is not exhaustive):

Support for Aristotelian virtue ethics:

- Eudaimonia (whether understood as 'happiness' or 'living well' or 'doing well') is a common (if not universal) aspiration of humankind and therefore an appropriate goal for the moral life.
- Anscombe supports an Aristotelian approach by noting that rigid laws/rules (as in Kantian deontological ethics) do not make sense in the absence of a law/rule-giver (eg God). Moral philosophers should therefore focus on the well-being/flourishing of a human life with all its dimensions working in harmony (holism).
- In the light of all that we know about the human species (eg through evolutionary biology and anthropology) human beings are still best understood in Aristotelian terms: eg as 'rational animals' (eg Geach). Students may therefore defend Aristotelian virtue ethics through the function argument, based as it is on this reputedly essential characteristic of human nature (ie rationality).
- Students may qualify the latter with an acknowledgment that our modern understanding of human biology and psychology make Aristotle's own views on women and slaves indefensible today, but his insights into the nature of 'man' can and should be expanded to be inclusive of all human beings and (possibly) some non-human animals (eg MacIntyre).
- Students may argue that the importance of education and habituation in the cultivation of moral virtue is empirically demonstrable (in those we admire as moral exemplars); by contrast, we do not (typically) attribute admirable moral decisions to the application of abstract universal principles or speculative consequential calculations. Furthermore, we recognise the truth that we are not born moral - so, no one is evil by nature.
- The 'doctrine of the mean'---properly understood to mean registering the appropriate feeling/emotion, at the appropriate time, motivating the appropriate action---is applicable to practical moral education with the potential to develop moral character throughout a lifetime.
    - *"So too anyone can get angry, or give and spend money - these are easy; but doing them in relation to the right person, in the right amount, at the right time, with the right aim in view, and in the right way. – that is not something anyone can do, nor is it easy."* II.9 *Nicomachean Ethics*
- Some students may argue that virtue ethics rightly places greater emphasis on how moral agents feel about their morally good action---eg commending those who take pleasure in acting for the good of others rather than seeing this as a form of self-interest without moral worth.

Criticism of Aristotelian virtue ethics:

- Aristotelian virtue ethics cannot give sufficiently clear guidance about how to act: the doctrine of the mean is too vague (given that it depends on the person, the circumstance, and seems unmeasurable).
- The issue of clashing/competing virtues (eg might kindness clash with courage?).
- The possibility of circularity involved in defining virtuous acts and virtuous persons in terms of each other: virtuous acts as acts performed by virtuous people, and virtuous people as those who perform (or are disposed to perform) virtuous acts.
- The relationship between the good for the individual and (wider) moral good: Must a trait really contribute to eudaimonia in order to be a virtue? There may be virtues relating to our treatment of the environment and wider society which do not contribute to our eudaimonia.
- Aristotle's account of ethics leaves too much down to luck (and yet, perhaps in tension with this, Aristotle holds people responsible for their ignorance of virtue).
- The application of Mackie's argument from relativity: If there are moral facts (eg about the virtues), then why is there not more agreement about them?
- Objections to the function argument:
    - Humans do not have a function: there cannot be a function without a function-giver (Sartre's point that, without God, "existence precedes essence").
    - Even if something is our unique function this does not imply that we should fulfil it - this could be linked to Hume's is-ought gap.

    - (Some) animals share the functions that Aristotle sees as uniquely human (reasoning, deliberation, language). Aristotle wrongly excludes animals from moral consideration and contribution.
    - There are other unique human functions (some being morally suspect/bad) which are ignored in Aristotle's account.
- Application of Moore's 'open question argument' to insist that goodness (of a person) cannot be reduced to the possession of certain virtues.

- NB: Students are free to advocate one or more rival moral theories (eg Kant's deontological ethics) over Aristotle's virtue ethics. They may also critically compare Aristotle's position with one or more rival moral theories (eg act and rule utilitarianism). But discussion of these alternative theories is only credit worthy to the extent that it is used to analyse and evaluate Aristotelian virtue ethics.

Notes
Students should not be unduly penalised for misattributing arguments: the focus is on AO2 (evaluation). Persistent misattribution of arguments would be an imprecision that would justify not awarding an argument full marks, but it should not be regarded as a reason for excluding it from the top band (assuming everything else meets the requirements of the level descriptors).

This indicative content is not exhaustive; other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.